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The "take-off," one of the five stages of economic growth distinguished 
by w.w. Rost~~, is"••• the great watershed in the life of modern societies••• 
(when) growth becomes (a) normal condition,"
1 This aeronautical methaphor is 
employed as a synonym for "industrial revolution," for Rostow notes that 
"the take-off is defined as an industrial revolution, tied directly to radical 
changes in methods of production, having their decisive consequence over a 
2relatively short period of time." Both the empirical validity and analytical 
worth of Rostow's analysis have been severely criticized,
3 It is by no means 
evident either that economic growth has typically conformed to Rostow•s stages, 
or that recent economic developments place the Republic of Korea (South Korea) 
in the take-off stage. 
Yet in the years after the Korean Har (1950-1953), something has happened 
to transform a virtually stagnant economy in Korea into one of the world's most 
rapidly growing economies in the 1960's.
4 When Professor Rostow visited Seoul 
in the spring of 1969, he was quoted to the effect that "Korea might save four 
115 or five years in completing the take-off stage. The country's remarkable rrowth 
in the last few_ years (real output rose 13 percent in 1968, almost 16 percent in 
1969, and probably about 10 percent in 1970) has begun to attract widespread 
attention, 6 This growth has also raised the question of whether the economy is 
"taking-off" or not, a question which would never have been asked before 1963. 
This question is essentially speculative. Rostat~•s take-off is considered 
to be a take-off into self-sustained growth, not an abortive flight followed by 
a crash landing. By 1981, observers should be able to answ@_t' the questiont but 
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today they cannot. The interesting and fruitful issues now, in 1971, lie 
elsewhere. In particular, what is the evidence of a shift from stagnation to 
growth? To what extent has change in the tempo of development been accompanied 
by a restructuring of the economy? Changes in the pace of growth are likely 
to be marked not only by more of the same, but also by differences in kind. 
What are the causes of accelerated growth? The costs and the benefits? Finally, 
what are the prospects for the future? Some of these questions, particularly 
the last, are no less speculative than that of whether Korea is not-1 in the 
take-off stage or not. But the questions posed here are different in kind from 
the take-off question, for evidence exists at present which can be used to 
provide answers to such questions, even if only limited or intuitive answers. 
I. - The Evidence 
Analysis of economic growth in Korea is usually limited to South Korea 
in the period after liberation from the Japanese in 1945. Though today's 
Republic was once part of a unified Korea which, in turn, was a major link in 
the Japanese empire, independence and division have created a new economy. 
This economy cannot be legitimately compared either ~ith all of Korea or 
the Southern provinces before 1945. The sum of the parts, for once, does not 
equal the whole. Since continuous, reasonably reliable economic data extend 
back only to 1953 or even later, this analysis is limited for practical reasons 
to the period after the Korean War. 
Gross national product (GNP) measured in constant (1965) prices is shown 
in the chart and table at the end of the paper. Constant-price or real GNP is 
used here to disentangle the effects of price increase from output growth on 
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GNP measured in current prices. This is particularly necessary when rates .. ot__ 
inflation-vary sharply from year to yea-r (compare the 1964-65 with the.1965-66-
. ______price indexes shown.. in the .table•. i;olumn 3). Real GNP is related in the chart . -
to the GNP which would have resulted if output·had grown evenly (at a--constant. 
_percentage rate) from 1953 to 1969. Comparison reveals a gap which opened to 
71962 before closing in later years. With the exception of 1957 1 · growth before 
1963 is of a different and lower order of magnitude than growth afterward. 
(This is confirmed by the annual increase rates sho"m in the table, column 2). 
The annual rate of increase in GNP averaged 4.6 percent from 1953 to 1962. The 
8 average more than doubled (to 10.9 percent) after 1962. 
Private consumption and gross domestic capital formation, two major 
components of expenditure on national product, are given in columns 5 and 7 
of the table. The consumption figures, divided by population estimates (column 
4). show that the increase in average per capita consumption was insignificant 
from the mid-1950's until the early 1960's. Individual consumption has risen · 
almost 50 percent since then. International comparison of consumption and other 
expenditure components is known to be treacherous, but it is notewo~thy that 
an average consumption of 23.3 thousand won in 1965, for example, was equivalent 
.....to less than 90 dollars at the prevailing exchan~e rate, An increase of 50 
percent from such a level can only have profound and welcome welfare effects. 
The increase in per capita consumption is a product of offsetting factors. 
On the one hand, GNP and total available resources (GNP plus net borrowing and 
transfers from the rest of the world) have risen sharply in recent years while 
the annual rate of population increase has declined from 3 percent in 1955-60 
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to 2.6 percent in 1960-66 and 1.9 percent in 1966-70. The share of resources 
(and GNP) going to capital formation (i.e. investment), on the other hand, 
has increased too. This is not entirely at the expense of consumption since 
capital formation today increases output available for consumption or further 
investment tomorrow. Nevertheless, the rapid increase in 'domestic investment 
from 10-12 percent of GNP in 1959-61 to almost 30 percent in 1967-69 (see table, 
column 10) has probably held down consumption in recent years. 
Capital formation and the share of capital formation in total output (the 
investment ratio) both began to accelerate in 1963. The rate of capital formation 
is generally considered the primary determinant of economic growth in modem 
growth theory. To the extent that investment actually determines the rate of 
increase in GNP, the rapid growth of investment to over a third of GrTT' in 1969 
9has been responsible for Korea's remarkable growth rates in recent years. 
This investment has been financed from foreign and domestic sources (see 
table, columns 8 and 9). Domestic saving was negligible and even negative (when 
measured in constant, 1965 prices) in earlier years, but began to increase in 
1963, almost doubled between 1965 and 1966, and has risen since then to account 
for more than half of total saving in 1967-69. Foreign saving increased to 1957, 
and then declined until 1966 before rising once more. 
"Foreign saving" is calculated here by subtracting exports from imports 
(and net factor income from abroad); it is pretty much eouivalent to Korea's 
current-account balance of payments which, in turn, is dominated by merchandise 
exports and imports (see table, columns 11 and 12). The current-account balance 
(a deficit each year since 1953) has been covered by foreip,n aid, particularly 
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U.S. aid, and by private lendinp:. American aid and UNKP.A (United Nations Korean 
Reconstruction Agency) supplies totaled 4.3 billion dollars between 1945 and 1969. 
Approximately 1.8 billion dollars was received in the form of commercial loans 
and direct private investment from 1959 through early 1970, mainly in 1966 and 
afterward. The decline in foreign savinp, since 1957 and its subsequent recovery 
reflects the gradual reduction in aid levels and the more recent increase in 
commercial borrowing. 
Export growth since 1963 has been phenomenal. ExnQrts doubled from 1963 
to 1965, and almost doubled again from 1965 to 1967 and from 1967 to 1969. Less 
than a fifth of total exoorts were manufactures in 1957-59, but manufactures made 
up more than three-fifths of the total by 19690 The rapid P.rowth of manufacturing, 
the main component of the secondary sector (see table, column 15),~has-essentially 
10
been export-led growth since 1963 or 1964. 
Apricultural output has increased. too, but at a lesser rate since output has 
11
had to rise from a much larger base. The result has been a change in industrial 
structure which accelerated in the mid-1960's. The share of the secondary sector 
rose almost 10 percentage ooints during the decade from 1953 to 1963-64. It rose 
another 10 points during the five years from 1964 to 1969. This increase has 
been almost wholly at the exnense of the nrimary sector (predominantlv agriculture), 
since the share of the "other" sector (trade, transport, government, and the 
remaining service industries) has reaained nuite stable. 
Shifts in sectoral output shares are only one sign of the massive forces 
in Korea that are transforming an agricultural, rural society into an urban, 
industrial one. Changes in labor force composition, the widening gap between farm 
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and non-farm incomes, and flight to the cities are other signs. 
Manufacturing employment doubled from 1963 to 1969. The number of per­
sons employed in agriculture actually dropped during the period. Value added 
per worker in agriculture averaged 127 thousand~ in 1968; the figure for 
manufacturing was 340 thousand. With a difference in productivity of this 
magnitude, clearly economic development is not only a matter of increasing 
output per worker in each sector, but also a process in which the center of 
economic gravity shifts from low-productivity to high-productivity activities. 
This shift has been accelerated in Korea by increasing urban-rural income 
disparity. Average annual farm-household income equaled 179 thousand won in 
1968. Annual incomes of urban wage-earner families averaged 221 thousand. Urban 
wages quadrupled from 1963 to 1968; farm-household income rose 92 percent. 
The standard of living (real income) of urban workers doubled during this period 
12
while farm families were no better off in 1968 than they were in 1963. Is 
it surprising that the number of non-farm households lias increa~ed-four times 
as fast as the number of farm households in recent years? Or that Seoul's 
population rose from 2.4 to 5.5 million persons during the past decade? 
The evidence here, to summarize briefly, shows a marked acceleration in 
the pace of economic growth after 1963 or 1964 which distinguishes more recent 
years from the decade 1953-1962. This acceleration is seen in annual rates of 
increase in GNP, per capita consumption, capital formation, and in the investment 
ratio. It is also found in the shifting sectoral distribution of output. The 
share of manufactures, led by exports, has risen while agriculture's share has 
fallen. This shift has its counterpart in the labor force, where a larger 
proportion of workers now works in factories rather than in the fields, and in 
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population distribution, as Korea becomes increasinr,ly urbanized. Insofar as 
the process described here, to quote Rostow, "·•• (is) tied directly to radical 
changes in methods of production, havinp, their decisive consequences over a 
relatively short period of time," then Korea's take-off began seven or eight 
years ago. The take-off concept itself, as noted earlier, is subject to major 
reservations. Moreover, that this acceleration in the temoo of economic activity 
really constituted a take-off is also debatable, since we have not yet had the 
benefit of sufficient hindsip.:ht to test the hypothesis adequately. Fhatever one 
wishes to call it, the major shift in Korea's economic situation deserves an 
explanation. An explanation is offered in the next section of this paper. 
II. - The Causes 
Any evaluation of the acceleration in I~orea 's rate of economic development 
in the early 1960's must explain why prowth was slow from the end of the Korean 
War to approximately 1963, what hapnened at the tiMe to change the situation, 
and why subsequent growth has been so rapid. 
Slow growth after the Korean Har is difficult to understand in the immediate 
historical context. The war was responsible for about one million casualties 
in the South :frof\1 a population of 20 million. Physical damage was estimated to 
13al~ost equal the value of total output in 1953. Reconstruction of the 
shattered economy should have resulted in hip:h grouth rates if only because 
output reached very lou levels durin!! the war. The answer to this apparent 
paradox is that the battle line stabilized in early 1951, while agricultural 
and industrial output recovered to pre-war levels by 1953. Recovery was 
remarkably swift, a tribute to the Korean people, but earlier output levels were 
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low and the basic problems which had bedeviled the economy still persisted. 
Liberation from Japan and division of the Korean peninsula in 1945 had 
left the South a truncated part of a major component of the former Japanese 
Empire. Korea's comparative advantage within the Yen Bloc in producing rice, 
iron ore, chemicals, and other products ended with liberation in 1945. Separation 
of the country into North and South broke up a highly complementary economy in 
which rice and barley were mainly gro~,m in the South, beans and cereals in the 
North. Most textiles and machine tools were manufactured in the South, while 
metal and chemical (especially fertilizer) production was centered in the North. 
The division of an interdependent economic system clearly caused many 
problems. For example, light bulbs fabricated in Korea used tungsten filaments 
imported from Japan. Korea had exported the tungsten ore to Japan, but now had 
no filament-making facilities. Similar examples of disrupted economic ties 
could be listed indefinitely, but the major case in the South after liberation 
was in agriculture, and the immediate results were hunger and rice riots. 
Though "starvation exports" of rice no longer had to be shipped to Japan, 
the domestic supply was inadequate because fertilizer could not be obtained 
from the North. Also, there were more mouths to feed. The population of 
the South rose from 16 million in 1944 to over 20 million in 1948-49 as many 
15
Koreans returned from Japan and ~anchuria and others emir.rated from the North. 
The American Military Government (AMG) under General Hodge, faced with severe 
economic and political problems it was not adecuately prepared to handle, eventually 
established compulsory rice collection and brought fertilizer to replace that 
no longer available from the North. 
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In addition to the major problem of feeding a swollen population, the 
AMG faced a host of other immediate problems. One was that plant and 
equipment had been run down and the economy cannibalized to meet war needs. 16 
Korea's capital stock was consequently in poor shape. Limited productive 
capacity and severance of former economic ties combined to cause massive 
17unemployment. Also, the Japanese had monetized their assets (life insurance 
policies were paid out in full, etc.) in preparation for departure. Monetization 
18plus shortages of necessities led to rampant inflation in 1945. The United 
States responded to these problems during the occupation with a series of 
relief measures. Aid imports, for example, were composed mainly of food and 
raw materials rather than equipment. This was essentially a holding operation 
19rather than a development program. 
After the occupation forces left, an independent Republic of Korea was 
established under the presidency of Syngman Rhee in August 1948. It was now 
becoming evident that this dismembered ex-colony would have to be transformed 
into a viable, independent economy. As a result, American aid policy began to 
shift from relief to longer-term development aid. 20 The issues now were how 
to develop economic independence and what to do first. 
The basic outlook in 1948 appeared bleak. Only a fifth of the land area 
was arable yet Korea had one of the world's highest population densities. The 
economic structure was lopsided, with redundant export industries on the one hand 
and insufficient capacity to meet domestic needs on the other. Three-quarters 
of the population was illiterate at the time of liberation. After the Japanese were 
repatriated, Korea was left with virtually no administrative, managerial, or 
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technical manpower. 
Hhen the Korean War erupted less than two years after the founding of 
the Republic, too little time had passed and the political situation was too 
turbulent to expect much economic progress or the establishme:::i.t· of economic 
programs. The period from the armistice in July 1953 to the student revolution 
in April 1960 was sufficiently long, however, for government economic priorities 
to be set and for development efforts to show results. Land refonn was 
completed by 1958; food production rose roughly 50 percent from 1949 to 1959; 
illiteracy was reduced sharply, and primary education greatly expanded. In-
21
dustrial production doubled from 1955 to 1960, largely through import substitution. 
Despite these gains, the overall pace of growth was unsatisfactory. Real out;.mt 
rose at an annual average rate of 5 percent from 1953 to 1959, but three-fifths 
of this increase was eaten up by population growth. 
Given the basic outlook in 1948 and the havoc of the Korean War, one may 
argue that any progress was sufficient and that satisfactory rates of development 
could not be expected for several generations. This argument is simplistic 
because it fails to recognize the favorable factors. Korea had been well along 
22
the road to industrial development by 1939-41. Though higher-level talent 
was missing, the more basic skills were available, Also, the United States was 
already committed in 1948 to help Korea become '.'a display window of democracy. 
023 
The conunittment was strengthened by the Korean Par so that large-scale aid in 
24
the 1950's gave Korea one of the world's highest levels of per-capita assistance. 
Hhat progress occurred before 1960 was achieved despite the lack of any 
coherent government economic program and despite the handicap of mistaken economic 
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1 . i 25po 1.c es. These can be blamed on inexperienced administration, but the 
basic cause was President Rhee. He knew little of economics and had no plan 
26for economic development. The first opportunity for any sort of coordinated 
government economic policy occurred when the Rhee regime was overthrown in 
May 1960. The successor government of Dr. John M. Chang (Chang Mye>n) was 
too brief and unstable for new economic policies to be adopted before it was 
turned out by a military coup in -:-1ay 1961. 27 The military junta, led by 
General Park Chung Hee, was succeeded in 1963 hy civilian government under 
General (new President) Park. The government since 1961, unlike that in 
earlier years, has been a stable, conti~uous force with pronounced economic 
28goals. 
The economic slowdo\m in 1959-1962 (see table, column 1) was due to 
poor crops in 1959-60 and again in 1962, and the disruption and uncertainty 
which followed the student revolution and military coup in 1960 and 1961. 
A poorly conceived currency reform in June 1962 also had a depressing effect 
on economic activity. By 1963, however, better harvests and heavy investment 
in First Five-Year Plan (1962-1966) projects caused GNP to rise substantially. 
Rapid growth from 1963 on can be attributed to planning, new policies, 
' 
accidental factors, and basic sources of economic strength. Like computers, 
five-year plans have been endowed with powers they do not possess and made 
the subject of much economic science fiction. To be taken seriously a plan 
must be more than a shonping list of projects, and more than an exercise 
in futility by government economists who either lack the information needed to 
draw up an adeq_aate plan or whose government is unwilling or unable to 
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implement one. If a plan meets the necessary conditions for credibility, 
then it can be used like a map on which the course of the economy has been 
plotted for the next five years. As is often the case with maps, however, 
the map may prove misleading, there may be detours due to unforeseen circumstances, 
or one may miss signs and either overshoot or stop short of the destination. 
In Korea, unlike many other developing countries, the five-year plans 
can be taken seriously. The Second Plan (1967-1971), with annual modi­
fication, has served as a guide to the country's economic future and so, 
to a lesser extent, did the First Plan. The Third Plan (1972-1976), which 
is now being prepared, will undoubtedly perform the same function. The First 
and Second Plans established aggregate growth-rate targets and sectoral output 
goals. The amounts of foreign and domestic investment needed to meet the 
various targets are specified. Less detailed information on savings sources 
and labor requirements is also provided, Each plan, despite inclusion of 
a proposal to achieve self-sufficiency in food P,rains production, has emphasized 
29industrialization with particular stress on the expansion of manufactures. 
The plans set targets but usually do not specify how they are to be 
reached. This appears, at first sight, to be dodging the issue. When plans 
are being constructed, however, the anpropriate choice of policies needed to 
implement them is not readily apparent" Nor is the quantitative effect of 
a particular policy decision likely to be known in advance, though attempts 
are of course made to predict such thinfs. A nstabilization p;:-ogram," or set 
of new policies adopted in 1963-1965, does not anµear in the plans. This 
program had a major impact on Plan achievement and subsequent p.:rowth. 
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Government deficits, financed mainly by borrowing from the central bank, 
had been the main factor responsible for increase in the ~oney supply and a 
chronic cause of inflation since 1954. Beginning with the budgets of 1963-
64, budgets were adjusted -- first by holding down expenditure, later by 
increasing revenues -- so that the government would be a net saver rather than 
a net borrower. This new role of government as saver has limited inflation 
30which, at Korean rates, has probably retarded development. To the extent 
that the increase in government saving is greater than the reduction in saving 
of those whose taxes rose, and insofar as government funds are used more 
productively than the same funds would have been were they still in private 
hands, greater government saving has also contributed directly to economic 
growth. 
A major de.valuat;f;on \Of the ~ took place in June 1964 (from 130 to 255 
per dollar). The won has since depreciated to 315 per dollar at the end of 1970, 
The 1964 devaluation, and the simultaneous elimination of multiple-exchange 
rate devices and relaxation of quantitative import restrictions, all made 
export more attractive relative to domestic sales for Korean producers. The 
import liberalization which accompanied devaluation expanded government revenues 
(from duties on imports), sustained counterpart fund receipts, and reduced the 
profiteering and resource misallocation which occur when the price of foreign 
exchange is too low to reflect its actual scarcity. Liberalization has also 
limited the growth of noncompetitive, low-productivity industries which flourish 
like weeds behind the protective import barriers used to prop up an overvalued 
currency. 
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The interest-rate "reform" of September 1965 was another dramatic policy 
move. The basic loan rate (on bills) was doubled, while rates on some time 
31
and saving deposits more than doubled. Like devaluation, the purpose of 
the reform was to correct unrealistic prices, in this instance the prices 
paid to savers and charged to borrowers. The average annual rate of inflation 
(19 percent) had been above the bill rate (14 percent) and payments on savings 
deposits (15 percent or less) in 1960-65. Savers were being asked to subsidize 
borrowers, which is patently ridiculous in a capital-scarce country like Korea. 
The results were predictable. Demand for loans exceeded supply, and supply 
was limited because savers placed their funds in the unorganized money market. 
With reform, savings deposits in banks doubled between September 1965 and 
April 1966. As with fiscal stabilization, the interest-rate reform can be 
evaluated according to how much it increased savtn~s and whether savings were 
better utilized after the event than before. Most of the new deposits in banks 
were probably transferred froM the private (unorganized) market. Since private 
lending is illegal, the size and loan characteristics of the unorganized market 
are unknown. It is probable, however, that the reform increased saving and 
improved the overall utilization of loans. 
Devaluation and the interest-rate reform both constituted readjustment of 
administered prices which had gotten out of line. In addition, a series of 
more positive measures were adopted to promote exports and encourage foreign 
lending. Tax exemption, easy access to low-cost loans, and direct subsidies 
have been used to encourage export. By the spring of 1969, when the exchange 
rate was 285 ~ per dollar, these incentives were estimated to be worth from 
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40 to 52 won per dollar's worth of exports. 
Foreign lending has been encouraged by political stability, rapid 
growth of exports (which provide the foreign exchange needed to repay loans), 
and Korea's limited foreign-debt service obligations. In addition, the 
Bank of Korea and more recently the Korea Exchange Bank have guaranteed re­
The results can be seen in the foreign currencypayment of foreign loans. 
liabilities (guarantee acceptances) of these banks. Acceptances totaled 
26 billion llim. in 1965; they reached 413 billion~ by August 1970. The 
increase in exports has already been seen (table, colmnn 11). 
Random or exogenous events with major consequences for the Korean economy 
have included atypical weather and war in Vietnam. In 1964 and 1966, for 
example, harvests were unusually good because weather conditions were 
particularly favorable, Draught was largely responsible for a drop in the 
GNP growth rate from 13.4 percent in 1966 to 8.9 percent in 1967. The influence 
of weather on growth should diminish as agriculture's share in total product 
declines. 
peak of almost 14 million dollarsMerchandise exports to Vietnam reached a 
in 1966 before declining more recently. Most of the war related dollar earnings, 
(mainly to the two U.S. divisionshowever, have come from "sales to U.N. forces" 
stationed in Korea, but also an unspecified amount of receipts from Vietnam) 
and U.S. offshore procurement, which includes payments to Korean contractors 
in Vietnam and costs of maintaining Korean troops stationed in Vietnam since 
1966. Receipts from these sources (presumably included under "government, 
n.i.e,, military transactions" in the balance of payments) doubled from 1966 
to 1969. They accounted for a little over 20 percent of total exports of goods 
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and services in 1969. As Japan benefitted from the Korean War, so has Korea 
34
benefitted from war in Vietnam. 
Basic resources or elements of economic strength, most of which existed 
before 1963, have permitted Korea's rapid growth in recent years. Without 
such resources, the best planning, most sophisticated policies, or simple good 
luck are likely to prove ephemeral. Their possession may be a necessary con­
dition for rapid growth, but it is not a sufficient condition since these 
resources were part of Korea's economic endowment during the earlier era of 
unsatisfactory progress. 
A literate, relatively well-educated labor force is perhaps the main element 
of Korea's economic strength. Expenditure on education of seven to eight percent 
of GNP, which is undoubtedly above the international average, has given Korea 
an educational system on par with semi-advanced countries like Norway. 
35 Stress 
in education has been on quantity rather than quality, but Korean workers have 
probably been better able than most to adopt the new technioues and develop 
36
the new skills required by rapid industrialization. 
A second element is Korea's relatively well developed infrastructure. 
Though the transport and communications networks inherited from the colonial 
era were oriented toward North-South traffic, while East-Hest movement became 
more important after partition, the ne~vorks have been expanded to meet the 
increased demand generated by a growing nopulation and increasing levels of 
economic activity. The recently completed Seoul-Pusan expressway is a note­
worthy case in point. Similarly, electric output has risen sharply in recent 
years (generation doubled from 1962 to 1966, and doubled again from 1966 to 1969). 
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Inadequate infrastructure could have easily constituted a crippling bottleneck 
for industrialization in Korea. That it has not is largely due to the 
construction industry. The supply of skilled workers and production of 
construction materials have both been sufficient to meet most of the demand for 
net~ overhead facilities in recent years. 
Other elements which deserve more attention than can be given here are 
Korea's size, ethnic and linguistic homogeneity, location, and social and 
political structure. Size in this context refers not only to area (about equal 
to Indiana), but also to population, now almost 32 million. Neither area nor 
population are so large as to hamper communication or overtax administration, 
as in India or China, nor is the country so small that the internal market 
cannot support specialization or economies of scale. Imagine Korea with the 
population density of Sierra Leone; its population would then be only 4 million. 
Korea has also benefitted in recent years from oroximity to "the economic 
miracle", Japan, one of the villains in Korea's tragic modern history. This 
_prox:illity · has provided access to new ideas, new technology, and new markets, 
particularly after the signing of the normalization treaty between the two 
countries in 1965. Though blocked from trade with the North, China, and Russia, 
location near Japan means that Korea is not nearly so economically isolated as 
countries like Nepal or Burma. 
Because the population is quite homogeneous, there has been none of Ceylon's 
linguistic strife, Malaysia's ethnic conflict, Northern Ireland's religious 
battles, or Nigeria's separatist warfare, Political power is highly centralized 
because the government has not had to cater to local or regional interests, as in 
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Pakistan, nor is Korea saddled with a rigid social structure or tenure system 
in which ancestral origin or very skewed land holding determine individual 
status and prospects, as in much of Latin America. One consequence is that 
the government can govern. Korea is not a "soft state" like many of the 
South Asian countries Myrdal describes in his Asian Drama. 
III. :-- Tb9 Ccmsequcmcrzs : 
Evidence of a shift from slow to fast growth in the early 1960's was 
found in the behavior of GNP, consumption, and other broad economic aggregates. 
The industrialization and urbanization which accompanied this shift were seen 
in sectoral-share estimates and demographic data, Such aggregate data have 
their counterpa:.:-t in individual experience. Accelerated growth has provided 
sufficient food and shelter, opportunities for worthwhile employment, and an 
37optimistic outlook for many persons who had none of these ~nearlier years. 
Though the average Korean is still quite poor by international standards, he 
• 38is der.::onstrably better off now than a decaue ag'.:>c 
Statistical 2.ggregates do not reveal the physical transformation which 
has accompanied rapid growth~ however, nor do they show qualitative changes. 
Any foreign visitor who stays long enough or returns mrer a period of years can 
see the new bui:1_dings ,md highways. increased traffic congestion and air 
pol:!:~tion are also visible~ though ,~.ot acknowledged in the national income 
statistics. We know that one of every 14 Koreans lived in Seoul in 1949; 
~he figure is now one in six, l·ie do not ree.lly know~ though) how urbanization 
and industrialization have influer.ced the pac-= of life, family structure, or 
the individual's sense of identity, 
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There are clearly non-economic as well as economic costs and benefits of 
rapid economic expansion. The realistic alternative to rapid growth is slow 
growth rather than no growth, Given past rates of population increase in 
Korea, slow growth entails little or no improvement in individual welfare. 39 
It is not clear how the balance of costs and benefits changes as growth 
accelerates. The economist's efficiency criteria are essentially static (one 
chooses among alternatives when everything else is "given") and provide no 
answere here. We all know that "haste makes waste," and every beginning 
economics student is taught that supply is more elastic in the long run than 
in the short run. Still, given the choice, most neople and governments --
in developing nations would choose rapid rather than slow growth. With low 
living standards and high rates of population increase, this is hardly surprising. 
Cost-benefit considerations of the sort raised here tend to be specu­
lative because there is no actual alternative to use as a measuring stick, and 
intuitive because the costs and benefits are essentially incommensurable. 40 
Prospects for the future, surprisingly, are more certain, This becomes less 
surprising, however, when one considers that the press is already carrying 
articles on the Third Plan 1972-1976) and that orevious events have future 
consequences. 
Extrapolation of past trends is normally used to predict future develop­
ments, and there is no reeson why Korea 7 s progress in the 1970 1 s should not 
resemble that in the second half of the 1960 1 s ~-f allowance is made for the 
effects of an even-larger base on growth rates, Past successes and neglect 
of particular problems are likely to alter the future path of development, however. 
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Agricultural modernization and manpower development, for example, are 
to receive more emphasis in the Third Plan period than in the past. These 
are cases of previous neglect. The costs of backward agriculture are 
evidently beginning to outweigh the benefits (more resources available for 
allocation elsewhere), while the previous assumption that the labor supply 
41would impose no constraints on growth is probably no longer true. 
A moderate growth rate (8.5 percent per year) is projected in the Third 
Plan. Development of the heavy machinery industry is to be encouraged. Greater 
reliance on domestic saving and an improved balance of payments are additional, 
42
related targets. These are, in a sense, goals which result from past success. 
Rapid growth has been led by exports of light manufactures The equipment ando 
much of the materials used to produce these exports have been imported, and 
financed in large part by borrowing abroad, which has increased dependence on 
foreign saving and led to current-account deficits in the balance of payments. 
Insofar as heavy machinery and other investment goods are produced locally, 
less foreign borrowing will be necessary. The net result, then, will be to 
increase the importance of domestic saving and reduce current-account deficits 
in the balance of payments. 
Export-led growth of light manufactures has provided access to foreign 
exchange, created opportunities for employmenti built manufacturing capacity, 
and generated impressive growth rates. The rising opportunity costs of 
emphasis on export promotion are reflected in Korea's increasingly overtaxed 
infrastructure, comparative neglect of agriculture and manpower requirements, 
and the postponement of previous plans for developing a petrochemical complex, 
integrated steel mill, and other heavy, import-substitute manufactures like 
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machinery. 43 Preliminary evidence indicates that the new elements in the 
Third Plan are designed to reduce these costs. 
The sort of investment required to meet the new plan goals tends to be 
That is, capitalmore expensive than investment in production for export. 
requirements (capital/output ratios) are much higher in the transport, 
communications, or power industries, for example, than in building export 
capacity. Agricultural modernization and manpower development require over­
haul of educational administration, creation of an effective extension service, 
and other kinds of institutional change which may take decades to achieve. 
The really cheap sources of growth, in short, have already been exploited. 
This is one reason that the Third Plan's projected growth rate is below rates 
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achieved in recent years. 
The main single determinant of Korea's growth in the near future is 
likely to remain export expansion. Either more exports or fewer imports will 
be required to right the balance of payments and reduce dependence on foreign 
saving. Import substitution, as experience elsewhere indicates, has proven 
to be a poor alternative to export expansion in closing the trade gap. 
45 
Until this gap is closed, growth will not be "self-sustained," to revert to 
Rostow's terminology. 
Export expansion has benefitted from diversification, both in markets 
a combination of low labor costs and a technologicaland in products, and from 
base which have allowed Korean exporters to ex!)loit comparative advantage in 
producing relatively simple, labor-intensive manufactures. Diversification 
has kept market shares small and thus reduced the likelihood of trade restriction. 
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It has also limited the risk associated with instability in markets for 
particular products. Although protectionist sentiment in high-wage countries 
is still a potential threat to Korean exports, as are the winding do~m of 
war in Vietnam and the U.S. troop withdrawals from Korea, the main problem is 
46internal. 
Korean exports are maintained by subsidy. The amount of subsidy needed 
to bring forth exports depends, in turn, on producers' costs and productivity. 
Manufacturing output more than doubled between 1965 and 1969 while employment 
rose only 50 percent. Productivity (output per worker) clearly increased, 
but wages did too, alnost two-and-a-half times. This wage increase has 
outstripped productivity growth so that unit labor costs rose, profits fell, 
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and more subsidy has been needed. Such developments cannot continue indef­
initely. 
Agricultural modernization, education and training, and the ~overnment's 
ability to meet social needs are among the more important internal factors 
which should influence the pace of economic development and levels of individual 
welfare in the long run. "Agricultural modernization" requires the raisinp, 
of wages and productivity in rural areas to approximate industrial levels. 
Increased productivity will probably not lead to self-sufficiency in food 
production, however, nor is it clear that such self-sufficiency is desirable. 48 
Modernization may or may not hasten the farmers' cityward flight, depending upon 
the· labor-irltep.sity ·of new production techniques;, but it should r~duce the 
disparity between farm,; and non-farm incomes. This disparity is a likely cause 
of increasing income. inequa1ity which, in turn, is a potential source of 
49political unrest. 
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The demand for new skills, like that for electricity, seems to increase more 
than proportionately with economic growth. Korea's trained manpower has 
been a major asset in the past, to the point that doctors, nurses, miners, 
and construction workers have been sent abroad to induce foreign-exchange 
earnings. Yet manpower projections indicate both shortage and surplus of 
particular skills (in particular, a shortage of technicians) that show no 
• 50 s i gn of abating. Korea is also a major victim of the "brain drain." The 
relative economic status of teachers has probably declined in recent yet.ts, 
51while the educational system suffers from administrative inflexibility. 
The system clearly needs to be reformed if manpower bottlenecks are not to 
strangle growth in the future. 
Korea's pattern of government expenditure differs from that of other 
Asian countries (and more economically mature nations as well) in that outlays 
. . d 52f or soci a1 services are quite mo est. There are historic and social reasons 
for this; moreover, private foreign agencies have assumed part of the welfare 
burden in the years after the Korean Har. Yet rapid urbanization has raised 
the social or external costs of living for many city dHellers while the 
extended family, the individual's traditional shelter in the time of need, has been 
eroded by city life styles. Again, as in the case of agricultural modernization, 
recent trends carry the threat of political disturbance. Government action 
will be necessary to meet social needs, if only to maintain political stability. 
Economists will probably note the absence of reference to market 
allocation or stabilization programs here. The reason is simple. Korea's 
basic economic problems are problems of growth rather than stability, the 
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government's economic role if pervasive, and conventional market allocation 
criteria are generally inapplicable. Others may wonder why nothing was said 
of administrative, ecological, or health problems, all of which have economic 
effects. The need for brevity and the tenets of comparative advantage both 
argued for the ommissions. 
Questions of procedure and coverage or discussion of particular economic 
problems should not be allowed to obscure the essential finding here: A basic 
shift in the pace of growth took place during the early 1960 's that transformed 
Korea from just another stagnant, underdeveloped country into one of the world's 
fastest growing economies. Hhether this was the "take-off" or not, as Rostow 
has used the term, is debatable, Hhatever the term, rapid grm'1'th experienced 



















































































The Korean Economy Since 1953* - 1 
p .Gross Annual rice -a/ Population I!_/ Private 
National Increase (%) Index: {thousands) Consumption 
Product in (1) 1965=100 ExEenditure 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
422 11.4 21,546 362 
447 6.0 15.0 381 
475 6.1 24.5 21,502 (C) 423 
480 1.2 31.7 22,307 445 
523 8.8 37.8 22,949 471 
552 5.5 37.6 23,611 486 
576 4.4 38.4 24,291 509 
589 2.3 41.9 24,989 (C) 523 
614 4.2 48.4 25,700 528 
635 3.5 54.9 26,432 569 
693 9.1 70.4 27,184 588 
750 8.3 92.9 27,958 620 
806 7.4 100.0 28,670 669 
914 13.4 112.9 29,193 (C) 717 
995 8.9 124.8 29,784 784 
1,127 13.3 139.8 30,469 874 
1,306 15.9 156.7 31,139 970 
1,436 (P) 9.7 (P) 178.7 (P) 31,461 (C) 
* All figures are billions of~, expressed in constant (1965) 
market prices, unless otherwise indicated. 
2,./ Implicit deflator for GNP. 
b/ Census figures for September 1 (1955), October 1 (1966, 1970), 
December 1 (1960), others are end-of-year estimates, except for 
1967-1969 (July 1 estimates). 
P Preliminary. 
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The Korean Economy Since 1953 - continued - 2 
Gross 
Per Capita Domestic InvestmentSavingConsumption Capital Ratio 
(1,000 ~) Formation Foreign S:/ Domestic (%) 
(6)=(5) ..-(4) (7) (8) (9)=(7)-(8) (10)=(7)¼(1) 
1953 16~8 70 70 0 16.5 
1954 58 50 8 12.9 
1955 19.7 61 71 ···10 12.9 
1956 19.9 57 87 -30 11.9 
1957 20.5 88 103 -15 16.8 
1958 20.6 78 83 -5 14.1 
1959 20.9 58 60 -2 10.0 
1960 20.9 62 69 -7 10.6 
1961 20.6 73 53 20 11.9 
1962 21.5 78 77 1 12.3 
1963 2L6 137 107 30 19.8 
1964 22.2 114 59 55 15.2 
1965 23.3 118 52 66 14.7 
1966 24.6 207 86 121 22.7 
1967 26.3 2lf2 111 131 24.3 
1968 28.7 344 177 167 30.5 
1969 31.1 451 211 240 34.6 
1970 
Foreign saving was derived by subtracting exports plus net factor 
income from abroad from imports. 
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The Korean Economy Since 1953 - continuad.- 3 
l1erchandise Industrial Origin of GDP !::.,I(%) 
Exports 2.,/ Imports :J_/ Balance :J_/ Primary!/ Secondary Jl/ Other 
(11) (12) (13)=(11)-(12) (14) (15) (16) 
1953 39.7 347.1 -307.4 51.2 8.9 39.9 
1954 25.1 241.2 -216.1 51.8 9.7 38.5 
1955 17.7 327.0 -309. 3 50.1 11.1 38.8 
1956 25.3 380.1 -354. 8 47.0 13.0 40.0 
1957 19.5 390.4 -370.9 47.0 13.3 39.7 
1958 17.3 343.7 -326.4 47.5 13.7 38.8 
1959 19.8 273.4 -253,,6 45.2 14.4 40.4 
1960 32. 9 305.4 -272.5 44.3 15.4 40.3 
1961 40.9 283.1 -242.5 46.5 15.1 38.4 
1962 54.8 390.1 -335. 3 42.5 17.0 40.5 
1963 86.8 497.0 -410.2 41.7 18.2 40.1 
1964 120.0 364.9 -244.9 44.6 17.8 37.6 
1965 175.1 420.3 -245.2 41.3 20.2 38.5 
1966 250.3 679.9 -429.6 40.7 20.6 38.7 
1967 334. 7 908.9 -574.2 35.8 23.6 40.6 
1968 486.2 1,322.0 -835. 8 32.0 26.1 41.9 
1969 658.3 1,655.9 -997.6 30.7 27.4 41.9 
1970 
d/ Hillions of U.S. dollars. 
e/ Grots domestic product at 1965 constant factor cost. 
ii Agriculture, forestry, and fisheries. 
.s_/ Mining, manufacturing, electricity and gas. 
Sources: Bank of Korea (BOK), Economic Statistics Yearbooks; BOK, 
Monthly Economic Statistics; Economic Planning Board (EPB), 
Korea Statistical Yearbooks. 
Footnotes 
1. W. W, Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto 
(1960), P• 7. 
2. l»id., P• 57. 
3. The main lines of criticism are as follows: a - modern growth has 
generally been continuous rather than discontinuous, with few clearly 
defined "stages"; b - stage theory imposes specious uniformity on 
economic history, whose essential characteristic is diversity; 
c - the analysis is non-operational. That is, one can only confirm 
that the "preconditions" for take-off existed after the fact, or that 
a take-off actually occurred if growth were subsequently sustained. 
See W.W. Rostow, edo, The Economics of the Take-off into Sustained 
Growth (1964). 
4. Figures on CNP growth rates during 1960-1967 for most countries can 
be found in the United Nations, Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 
(1968), Vol. II, Table 5-B, 
5. The Korea Times, June 20, 1969. The take-off stage normally takes 
several decades, according to Rostow. 
6. An article on the Korean economy in the :"forgan Guaranty Survey of 
October 1970, for instance, is entitled "South Korea: Asia's Newest 
Growth Economy." 
7. A logarithmic scale, which assigns equal distances to the same percentage 
changes, would perhaps have been more appropriate here. The absolute 
gap does not begin to close until 1966 (see chart), but the percentage 
gap (see table, column 1) begins to narrow in 1963 as annual percentage 
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increases rise above the 1953-1969 average. 
_8. Though -three stages might be distinguished from column 2 (slow growth 
from 1953 through 1958 or 1959, stagnation from 1960 through 1962, 
and rapid growth thereafter), simplicity of exposition and examination 
of causal £actors both suggest that two stages are sufficient. 
9. Investment and increase in output are conventionally linked by the 
incremental capital/output ratio. This measure is too unstable to 
be a useful policy parameter, and too aggregate to reveal the sectoral 
shares or shifts in investment which are major determinants of the 
investment-output relationship. The incremental ratio is designed 
to show the number of units of investment required to increase the 
annual product flow (GNP) by one unit. (A lagged relation is usually 
employed to calculate the ratio since this period's investment is 
unlikely to increase output until the next period). The average 
annual rate of increase in real GNP for the United States in 1963-1969 
was 4.8 percent, for example. The investment ratio in 1967-1969 
averaged 15 percent. Though the implied aggregate incremental capital/ 
output ~atio (3.8:1) was considerably higher than Korea's (2.0:1), 
when one tries to explain the difference, it is necessary to examine 
variation between the two countries in the sectoral allocation of 
investment, amount of excess capacity, and in relative prices and inputs 
of lalor and capital. The aggregate capital/output ratio hides more 
than it reveals here. 
10. The index of manufacturing production (1965=100) rose most rapidly 
after 1964. Production doubled during the five-year period from 
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1959 to 1964, and then tripled between 1964 and 1969. By 1969, exports 
accounted for roughly half of value added in manufacturing. 
11. Gross national product originating in agriculture (forestry and fisheries) 
was almost three times that originating in manufacturing in 1963. 
In addition to arithmetic reasons for slower growth, agricultural 
output has grown less rapidly than manufacturing production because 
investment in agriculture has been much lower (fixed capital formation, 
in constant 1965 prices, totaled 125 billion~ during 1963-69; 
the figure for manufacturing was 418 billion}, and labor input declined 
(from 4.8 million employed in 1963 to 4.7 million in 1969} while 
manufacturing employment doubled. Agriculture has also suffered from 
the well-known difficulties of applying new technology to small-scale, 
widely dispersed production units. Limited access to credit and adverse 
cost-price relationships are other factors in Korea which have served 
to limit growth of agricultural output. 
12. These figures are based on employment and wage data from the EPB, 
Annual Reports on the Economically Active Population, EPB, Annual 
Reports on the Family Income and Expenditure Survey. and Ministry of 
Agriculture and Forestry (MAF), Reports on the Results of Farm Household 
Economy Survey and Production Cost Survey of Agricultural Products. 
13. Bank of Korea, Annual Economic Revie'iv 1 1955, Appendix Tables 8-9. 
14. Output in the fiscal year ending in l1arch 1954 was virtually back to 
the prewar level reached in 1949-1950. "This is a remarkable recovery 
by any standard" (John P. Lewis, Reconstruction and Development in 
South Korea. [National Planning Association, December 1955], pp. 18-19). 
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15. Migration from Korea before liberation was so large that "at least 
10 percent of the Korean population was abroad" (Lee Chung-myun, 
"Population Movement of Korea--International Movement," Korean Affairs 
[1963], P• 21). By 1940, Osaka contained the third largest Korean 
population after Seoul and P'yongyang (Irene B. Taeuber and George 
w. Barclay, "Korea and the Koreans in the Northeast Asian Region," 
Population Index [October 1950], p. 287). Return migration was heavy 
at the end of World War II but the official statistics published by 
the South Korean Interim Government (SKIG) and the Supreme Allied 
Commander for Japan (SCAP) are too incomplete to estimate gross flows. 
16. "Even the iron water mains and fire plugs were taken up during the 
war and concrete pipes substituted" (Earnest J. Fisher, "Korea Today," 
Far Eastern Quarterly [Hay 1946], p. 263). 
17. Almost 900 thousand were listed as unemployed (from a population of 
20.2 million) as late as May 1949. Th~ actual number was probably 
higher. See Bank of Chosen~ Annual Economic Review, 1949, Table 173. 
18. The Seoul wholesale price index rose almost 800 percent between 
April 1945 and September 1945. These were official prices. Black 
market prices were 20 or 30 times official prices immediately before 
the war's end (George M. McCune, Korea Today [1950], p. 103). 
19. This is hardly surprising since Korea's importance to United States 
national interests had never been defined (see Soon Sung Cho, Korea 
in World Politics: 1940-1950 [1967], Chapter 12). Also, until it 
became evident that Korea was to remain divided, there was no basis 
for embarking on a program to develop ene portion of the peninsula. 
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20. The ECA (Economic Cooperation Administration, predecessor to AID) 
was scheduled to begin a three-year, 350 million dollar development 
program in Korea during fiscal 1950. Funds for expanding coal and 
electric-power output and building fertilizer plants were included in 
the program. See w. A. Brown, Jr., and R. Opie, American Foreign 
Assistance (1953), pp. 375-76. 
21. Food production (rice and other graius·, pulses, and potatoes) rose 
from 3.5 million metric tons in 1949 to 5.4 million tons in 1959. 
See UNKRA-FAO, Rehabilitation of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries 
in South Korea (1954), and HAF, Yearbooks of Agriculture and Forestry 
Statistics! Estimates of agricultural output are especially liable 
to error and bias, while sharp year-to-year variation in weather conditions 
makes single-year output estimates potentially•misleading indicators 
of trend. Nevertheless, output in the late 1950's was considerably 
a.hove that in 1949, the best post-liberation, pre-war year. 
A literacy drive after the war helped to reduce the proportion of 
·-illiterates to less than 30 percent by 1960. The number of primary 
school students rose from 1.9 million in 1945 to 3.6 million in 1960 
so that two-thirds of all children aged 6-11 were enrolled in primary 
schools in the latter year (Central Education Research Institute, 
Education in Korea 2 1966, p. 105, and EPB, Korea Statistical Yearboo15_, 1966).-
Available supply (domestic output plus imports less exports) of 
cement, flat glass, newsprint, and tires was largely produced in Korea 
by the late 1950's. 
22• The share of mining and manufacturing in net commodity product (e.g. 
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the net output of goods originating in agriculture, forestry, fisheries, 
mining, and manufacturing) had reached 35-40 percent by 1939-41. 
See Suh Sang-chul, "Growth and Structural Changes in the Korean Economy 
Since 1910," unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University, 1966, 
Table II-4. 
23. Brown and Opie, op. cit., p. 373. 
24. Korea received over 1.7 billion dollars in official grants and loans 
from 1955 through 1960, which amounts to a little over 73 dollars per 
person. 
25. The list of policy failures is endless, but insistence on overvaluation 
of the~' use of multiple exchange rates, finance of continued 
government deficits by borrowing from the central bank, and artificially 
low interest payments on savings are the main ones. 
26. President Rhee evidently believed, for instance, that inflation was 
caused by exchange devaluation. My judgment of Rhee's economic policies 
may be too harsh, for the sort of institutional change and educational 
reform required for economic growth is likely to be slow, and later 
progress can be traced back in part to developments under Rhee. Still, 
"his tragedy is that a lifetime devoted to his country should have left 
so little of lasting value" (Richard C. Allen, Korea's Syngman Rhee: 
An Unauthorized Portrait {1960], p. 235). 
27. This is not to say that there was no economic planning or any attempts 
to coordinate development policies. A three-year economic plan was 
approved three months before the Rhee government was overthrown. A 
new five-year plan was prepared by the Chang government. Given 
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Rhee's anti-planning bias, however, it is unlikely that the plan would 
ever have been implemented had he remained in power. See David C. Cole 
and Young Woo Nam, "The Pattern and Significance of Economic Planning 
in Korea," in Irma Adelman, ed., Practical Approaches to Development 
Planning: Korea's Second Five-Year Plan (1969), pp. 12, 16. 
28. Economic achievement has also served political ends. The ruling 
Democratic-Republican party sponsored a referendum in the fall of 
1969 to revise the constitution so that the president might serve a 
third term. President Park, campaigning for revision, said "I proposed 
the referendum because I thought that retaining the present system••• 
will contribute to economic development •••• I wanted to ••• add the 
finishing touch to the vast enterprises of construction I started" 
(The Korea Times, October 11, 1969) • 
2_9. See P. W. Kuznets, "Korea's Five-Year Plans," in Irma Adelman, ed-., 
op. cit., pp. 41, 54. 
3P. Most economists regard price increase as inevitable, and moderate 
rates of increase as possibly desirable. But when rates of increase 
rise above five or ten percent a year, price relations become increasingly 
distorted and the cost of such distortion is likely to outweigh possible 
benefits. (In Korea, annual price increases averaged over 20 percent 
in 1953-60, 19 percent in 1960-65, and 12 percent in 1965-69). 
See Graeme S. Dorrance, "The Effect of Inflation on Economic Development," 
IMF Staff Papers, 1963, and Harry G. Johnson, "Is Inflation the Inevitable 
Price of Rapid Development or a Retarding Factor in Economic Growth?", 
Halayan Economic Review, April 1966. 
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31. The yield on 18-month saving accounts went to 2.5 percent a month, 
or more than 34 percent a year! 
32. The Korea Times, April 27 and May 20, 1969. For a more detailed 
description of policy measures, see S. Kanesa-Thasan, "Stabilizing 
an Economy: The Korean Experience, 11 in Irma Adelman, ed., op. cit._, 
33. Balance-of-payments categories which combine receipts from-sales to 
U.N. forces in Korea with service payments earned by Korean contractors 
or troops in Vietnam were not designed for use in determining Korea's 
earnings from war in Vietnam. Similarly, annual reports of the Agency 
for International Development show military assistance programs (MAP's) 
by country, but not by activity~ so Korea's receipts cannot be obtained 
from the MAP budget for Vietnam. Recent testimony before the U.S. 
Senate revealed that military equipment originally valued at 3.4 billion 
dollars.had been given to allied governments (Korea was a major recipient) 
between 1951 and 1970 for a small fraction of cost, and that nearly 
a billion dollars had been paid to finance Korean combat troops in 
Vietnam since 1965 (The New York Times, Harch 29, 1970, p. 1, and April 1, 
1970, p. l; The Korea Times, September 13, 1970). One may conclude 
that Korea's earnings from the war in Vietnam are hard to define (what 
is a ten-year old destroyer worth?), that the balance-of-payments figure 
used here is too low to measure such earnings (governmen;, n.i.e., 
military credits totaled only 942 million dollars from 1965 through 
mid-1970), and that the actual amount--if it were known--would probably 
be much higher. 
34. Credits under the ·· 11 government, n. i.e. , military" category in Japan• s 
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balance of payments rose from 49 million dollars in 1949 to 803 
million in 1953. This item, which includes sales to military personnel 
stationed in Japan as well as sales to U.. N. forces under special 
procurement programs in connection with the Korean War, made up 
37 percent of Japan's total earnings from sales of goods and services 
in 1953. 
35. The expenditure estimate, for 1967, includes private as well as public 
outlays. It was released by the Office of Planning and Control 
(see The Korea Times, November 21, 1968). International comparison 
of educational expenditure is difficult because the share of private 
outlays in total expenditure varies widely, and because private expenditure 
data are often inaccurate or not available. One comparison, which 
includes Korea, is given in Frederic Harbison and Charles A. Myers, 
Education, Manpower, and Economic Growth (1964). 
36. That emphasis in Korea has been placed on quantity rather than quality 
was noted in the 1965 report of a Unesco advisory team for educational 
planning. 
term "sufficient" in this context, particularly with regard to37. The 
food, may be misleading. Nutritional standards are controversial and 
the published estimates are inconsistent (see narguerite C. Burk and 
Hordecai Ezekiel, "Food and Nutrition in Developing Countries," in 
Bruce F. Johnston and Herman 11. Southworth, eds., Agricultural Development 
and Economic Growth [1967]). The liinistry of Health and Social Affairs 
announced recently that the national average caloric intake was 2,105 
per day (The Korea Times, December 20, 1970); an earlier study gives a 
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figure of 2,438 as the national average for 1958~59 (Y. J. Yu, cited 
in E Hyock Kwon, et. al., A Study of Urban Slum Population [1967]). 
Still, there is undoubtedly less hunger--and better housing--than there 
was a decade ago. (Data on housing from the 1970 census of population 
and housing are not yet available). 
Unemployment statistics are suspect because they are based on 
quarterly surveys which cannot adequately reflect seasonal swings in 
agricultural work. Also, underemployment is more of a problem than 
unemployment in Korea and most other developing countries. Both 
employment and wage statistics show rapid growth of employment and 
wages, though, especially in manufacturing._ Such expansion of employment 
in manufacturing and other industrial activities is atypical, and suggests 
that unemployment and underemployment have lessened (see, for example, 
Charles R. Frank, Jr., "Urban Unemployment and Economic Growth in Africa," 
Oxford Economic Papers, July 1968). 
38. Korea ranked 71st of 80 countries included in a study of real per capita 
consumption in 1960. With the United Kingdom assigned a value of 100, 
Korea's index was 6 (see W. Beckerman and R. Bacon, "International 
Comparisons of Income Levels: A Suggested New Measure," Economic Journal, 
September 1966). If all other countries maintained their 1960 consumption 
levels, Korea's index would have advanced from 6 to 9 in 1969, but its 
rank would only rise from 71st to 61st. 
39,. Rates of population increase and economic growth are probably related, 
however.. Interaction between economic and demographic factors is largely 
ignored by economists and demographers. Better medicine and sanitation 
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may explain the practically universal decline in mortality which has 
occurred during the last few decades, but little is known of the factors, 
some economic, which determine fertility. It hardly seems coincidental 
that rapid economic growth in Japan, Taiwan, and Korea has been associated 
in recent years with declining rates of population increase, and 
unlikely that these rates would have declined or declined as much if 
economic growth, urbanization, and industrialization had been less rapid. 
40. How, for example, are the costs of breaking up the extended family 
system to be weighed against the benefits of more to eat for people 
living at subsistence levels? 
41. See Roger D. Norton, "Planning with Facts: The Case of Korea," 
American Economic Review, Hay 1970, pp. 62-63. Shortages of particular 
skills can be seen in sharp wage increases. Housing repair wages in 
Seoul, for example, rose more than any other component of the Seoul 
consumer price index from 1965 through 1969. 
42. See, for instance, The Korea Times, l!arch 18, April 16, and September 3, 
1970. 
43. New emphasis on any target necessarily implies previous neglect or 
revaluation of opportunity costs. Problems caused by neglect and those 
due to success can both be subsumed under the opportunity-cost concept. 
The distinction between the two types of problems is raised here 
because their causes are different. In one case a positive, successful 
program created new difficulties. In the other, continued neglect and 
a changing situation increased existing problems. 
44. Other reasons are credibility (it is hard to believe that the phenomenal 
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rates of the late 1960 1 s can be sustained) and opposition from the central 
bank and potential foreign aid <loners. These last are concerned with 
possible inflationary consequences of over-investment, and tend to 
discourage ambitious growth targets. On the other hand, underestimate 
of actual growth in the First and Second Plans has led to transport 
and power bottlenecks because too little investment was allocated 
for expanding the infrastructure. 
45. See for example, Alberto. Hirschman, "The Political Economy of Import 
Substituting Industrialization in Latin America,
11 Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, February 1968" 
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